Author / loewe418

by loewe418

Who’s Who in the Duma: A Guide to Russia’s Political Parties (Part I)

The first part of a two post series regarding Russia’s political parties. This first part will tackle the four major parties that are currently represented in the Russian State Duma.

Boring Background Information:

Russia has a few similarities with the Ukrainian political system in some respects, but is different in a large number of ways as well. I’ll be using Ukraine as a comparison foil in some cases since my last two posts were about Ukraine’s recent parliamentary elections and it’s still a bit fresh in my mind.

  • Russia is also a semi-presidential system with both a President and a Prime Minister.
  • Russia however has two houses of parliament making it a bicameral system (It is quite similar to the United States and the United Kingdom in this regard). It is composed of two chambers.
    • The State Duma (The equivalent to the Verkhovna Rada for Ukraine)
    • The Federation Council (An equivalent would be the Senate for the United States)
  • Russia’s presidential system has been subject to changes in its recent thirty year history, with the most recent change being the terms of the presidency (It is currently a six year term from the formerly four years per term)
  • Russia’s State Duma has legislative elections every five years (the most recent one occurring on 2016)
  • Similarly to Ukraine, Russia adopts a 50/50 split when it comes to allocating seats within the State Duma (A Mixed-Member Proportional System)
    • 50% of seats are allocated via a proportional party list system with a 5% electoral threshold for representation.
    • 50% of the seats are allocated via a First past the Post system for local constituencies.
  • Russia’s Upper House (The Federation Council) is actually unelected and chosen by territorial politicians. There are also no party affiliations (officially) within the Federation Council, unlike the State Duma.

The Party of Power

United Russia (Единая Россия)

Vladimir “I am the Duma” Putin speaking at the 17th annual Congress of United Russia

Stability, State and Corruption

2016 Duma Election Result: 54.2% (343 seats)

Party Chairman: Dmitry Medvedev

The party was officially founded on 2001 (as a merger of the Fatherland-All Russia and the Unity Parties). The ideology of the party has been described as a “catch-all national conservative party” with an emphasis on Russian nationalism, statism and maintaning political and economic stability. It had originally been created in the first term of Vladimir Putin as a force to support his policies within the legislative branch of the government. Due to this catch-all nature, it is a bit difficult to ascertain whether there is a specific ideology which it caters to (besides Russian statism and Putinism).

It does however does take some stances that are distinct for Russian politics, especially in terms of immigration. Both Putin and United Russia are quite heavily popular among ethnic minority republics in the country. The party (along with Putin) have been criticized of being too lenient and open towards migrants from Central Asia.

A clip from 2003 with Putin stating that Russians calling for “Russia for Russians” (a very ethnonationalist slogan) to be idiots or provocateurs.

As the party of government, United Russia has an overwhelming presence in the Duma along with regional parliaments around the country. The nature of Russia’s political system ever since the early 2000’s has almost entirely been a dominant party state. Sure, there might be opposition parties either sanctioned by the Kremlin (The Systemic Opposition) or frowned upon, but at the end of the day, United Russia has reigned supreme in the country’s political landscape. The party normally polled quite well (in a combination of genuine popularity, discouragement of opposition along with the occasional case of voter fraud) federally and in regional parliaments until the past few years.

Due to this, United Russia has the higher echelons of power within the country completely in her grasp, with the country’s Prime Minister (Dmitry Medvedev), Defense Minister (Sergey Shoygu) along with many others.

The party has been essentially tied to Putin both in political terms, along with the eyes of ordinary Russians. The successes of Putin are the successes of United Russia and vice versa. However, this effect goes the same for the failures of the state and of United Russia, which has been evident in the past few years.

However, Russia’s political scene as of late has made association with United Russia to be a severe disadvantage (when for years it was a must for those wishing to rise up the political ranks). After Putin announced unpopular pension reforms last year, along with slowing economic growth and unbridled corruption, United Russia has been reduced in popularity among the voting public leading to several losses in governors and in regional parliaments to pro-Kremlin opposition parties (The last time this occurred was in 2007).

A new technocratic oriented political culture along with a possible shakeup in Russia’s official and unofficial governance structure could spell the end of United Russia as a party that Russians have been familiar with for years.

Bleeding candidates fast, United Russia is already ceasing to be the party of the authorities. The party doesn’t fit well into the technocratic-apolitical worldview of the presidential administration’s domestic policy bloc.

Andrey Pertsev (Carnegie Moscow Centre)

Many United Russia members have ran for recent elections, not under the banner of the party, but as independents. Time will tell if United Russia in its current form can survive the next few years and if it has the strength to carry on in some format in a post-Putin political landscape.

The Systemic Eternal Opposition

Communist Party of the Russian Federation (Коммунистическая Партия Российской Федерации)

The Vanguards of the Revolution, or what’s left of them after thirty years

2016 Duma Election Result: 13.3% (42 seats)

First Secretary: Gennady Zyuganov

The second largest party in the State Duma, and the second most influential party in Russian politics. The Communist Party was founded in 1993 as the successor of the then defunct Communist Party of the Soviet Union in order to participate in legislative elections, as the Communist Party of the RSFSR was disbanded in 1991 under a decree by then President Yeltsin.

The current party’s ideology is quite varied due to the existence of factions within the party itself, with some ranging from Marxist-Leninists, reformist Marxists to left wing nationalists. The party has also deviated in some cases when it comes to nationalism, as the CPRF has embraced nationalist rhetoric and policies in some form. One political analyst has described the party more as a “national-patriotic” force rather than a communist one which members of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) would be familiar with.

It has several ideological differences with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, notably its embrace of a more positive and less critical view of Josef Stalin. It has established a more positive relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church and other religious authorities and is quite socially conservative in comparison to other Communist parties in Europe and North America.

In terms of foreign policy, the CPRF is totally supportive of the Kremlin’s actions, and in some cases have even voiced a stronger and more interventionist hand when it comes to areas such as Ukraine and other post-Soviet states. In fact, Zyuganov had called for the recognition of the two breakway rebel entities in Eastern Ukraine and the creation of a volunteer brigade to send to the area.

If I were in the place of the president, I would immediately accept Donbass [into Russia]

Gennady Zyuganov

Domestically, the party does toe the line that is quite familiar to those who have been exposed to modern day Communist parties, with state regulation, the imposition of a progressive income tax. Demographically, it has been jokingly labeled as the “party of pensioners”, as a substantial chunk of the Communist Party’s electorate are over the age of 60. The party has tried to tap in with the younger electorate in the past few years as a result of the declining electorate to mixed success.

Due to multiple reasons, the Communist Party has been described one of the three “in system” opposition parties when it comes to federal politics within the Russian Federation. The party has given muted opposition when it comes to the policies imposed by Putin and United Russia (until recently), but has had bitter election conflicts with United Russia regionally (The elections in Primorksy Krai and Khakassia are examples of this in 2018)

…the Communist Party belongs to Russia’s so-called “systemic opposition,” parties which historically have put up little resistance to the Kremlin’s policies.

Evan Gorshkevich (Moscow Times)

The party is currently led by Gennady Zyuganov, a perennial candidate for almost all presidential elections in Russia ever since 1996, when the CPRF had a chance of regaining the presidency. (The 1996 election is still one fraught with controversy in Russian history). While it has languished as a tolerated opposition party, there seems to be a change and a possible chance for the CPRF (and for that matter other in system opposition parties such as the LDPR) to have an opportunity in a post-Putin political landscape to increase their influence.

The somewhat surprising performance of Pavel Grudinin (who ironically is a well off businessman), the CPRF’s candidate for the 2018 Presidential Elections, along with Putin’s implementation of unpopular pension reforms has led to an opening for the CPRF to gather the left-populist demographic in the future. If socio-economic discontent within the country rises, the Communists will take advantage of it, despite their current cooperation with the authorities.

The future will tell if the CPRF will stop being continuously pushed into the sidelines and become a genuine opposition party contrary to the Kremlin’s wishes or continue languishing in its lame duck opposition position.

Liberal Democratic Party Of Russia (Либерально-демократическая партия России)

The Party of the Russian nationalist meme king himself, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, showman extraordinaire

2016 Duma Election Result: 13.1% (39 seats)

Leader: Vladimir Zhirinovsky

The third largest party in the State Duma, and the most overtly nationalist, the LDPR is actually the oldest of the four major parties represented in parliament. It was originally founded in April 1991, before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. There have been some rumours that the party was originally put into force by Soviet authorities to act as a spoiler for more genuine (and possibly more threatening) nationalist organizations such as Pamyat’ and others.

The party in the modern day has been essentially tied to their leader and Russia’s foremost perennial presidential candidate, Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Zhirinovsky has been the leader of the party since the 1990’s and has participated in every presidential election. He has a very colourful history and has been quite outspoken in Russian politics with his “interesting” remarks. This has made him the darling of ultranationalists in the country, along with those who find humour in his statements creating a small cult of personality around him. (Honestly I can write an entire article on his ridiculousness since it’s sometimes jaw droppingly offensive or hilariously absurd)

With more than two decades at the helm of the first registered post-Soviet opposition party, Zhirinovsky is an institution of Russian political life.

Eva Hartog (Moscow Times)

Domestically, the party espouses an ethnonationalist and reactionary message, with Zhirinovsky calling for the restoration of Tsarist symbols along with the rejection of using foreign words within the Russian language. However, he has been quite compromising with the country’s soviet past, calling for the return of Volgograd’s Stalin era name, Stalingrad along with others.

One of Zhirinovsky’s more absurd public appearances consisted of this election advertisement.

The LDPR has also called for the disbandment of the current political structure of the Russian Federation and replace it with the old Imperial system of “governorates”, making the country much more authoritarian and centralized. The party is however quite economically interventionist (a trend among right wing parties in Eastern Europe such as Law and Justice in Poland). The LDPR also calls for a the cessation of Article 282 on hate speech (Russia has remarkably robust hate speech laws), something which many nationalists in Russia support abolishing.

In terms of foreign policy, Zhirinovsky has called for an end or a limitation of migration from Central Asian republics along with the “regathering” of traditionally ethnic Russian lands to create a “Greater Russia”. During the 2018 Presidential Elections, he had claimed to support a return to the borders of the USSR in 1985 by demanding referendums in post-Soviet states.

I will protect Russians everywhere!

Vladimir Zhirinovsky (2018 Presidential Election)

As a result of Zhirinovsky’s qualities, most voters in Russia see him and his party as a “protest joke” vote, with only diehard nationalists genuinely voting for the LDPR. The party (along with the CPRF) were much stronger during the 1990’s but have over time submitted to the whims of the Kremlin in federal politics. Due to this, the party can be described as another of the “systemic opposition”. It remains to be seen how successful the LDPR will be in the future as most of its popularity harkens to Zhirinovsky himself. His departure from politics will provide a test for the LDPR, whether it can transition from a party of personality to a party of ideas and maintain its relevance in Russia’s political landscape.

A Just Russia (Справедливая Россия)

There’s another party in the Duma?

2016 Duma Election Result: 6.2% (23 Seats)

Leader: Sergey Mironov

The final major party in the State Duma is also the one I don’t know much about unfortunately, and something that could not even be considered a “separate entity” from United Russia in a certain sense. However, I will do my best to cover it.

The party was originally founded in 2006 as a merger of several minor parties such as Rodina, the Russian Party of Life and the Russian Party of Pensioners. Over the years, other political parties have merged into the “Just Russia” umbrella such as the Russian Ecological Party. After Februrary 2012, the party had however lost the Russian Party of Pensioners and the Russian Ecological Party

Ideologically, the party claims to be a “democratic socialist” party and is actually a member of the Socialist International and tries to collaborate with other socialist and social democratic organizations around the world. Some have described it as the “more left-wing” equivalent of United Russia designed to tap into the Communist Party’s electorate in order to facilitate the creation of a two party system in the country, with United Russia taking the right and A Just Russia taking the left.

A Just Russia played the role of a “left-wing opponent” of United Russia—but not of Putin himself.

Vladimir Kara-Murza (Institute of Modern Russia)

Domestically, the party advocates more economically interventionist policies in terms of creating a welfare state, but still wishes to maintain a market economy (This makes the party one of the least interventionist parties in the Duma, barring the economically liberal factions in United Russia). Like the CPRF, it also wishes to replace Russia’s flat tax system with a progressive one along with wage reforms.

If anything, the party was quite friendlier and much more supportive of Dmitry Medvedev and his modernization programme which he implemented during his term as president. Ever since 2012 however, the party has been fully supportive of the Kremlin’s policies, with those who had a streak of opposition to the Kremlin that were members of the party being ejected by the end of 2012.

In terms of foreign policy, the party takes the playbook of United Russia and the other systemic opposition parties by being supportive of Russian foreign policy as is. Sergey Mironov, the party’s leader had actually been subject to EU sanctions due to his vocal support for the separatists in Eastern Ukraine and was actually the first high level Russian politician to visit Donetsk after 2014. Mironov had also called for the Russian Federation to officially recognize the two separatist republics as well.

I see no reason to maintain trade relations with a country consistently pursuing anti-Russia policy.

Sergey Mironov (On recent trade restrictions with Georgia)

It is however still a member of the “systemic opposition” parties, in fact even more so than the LDPR and the CPRF as they did not field a candidate in the 2018 Presidential Elections and opted to support the presidential candidacy of Vladimir Putin. The future of the party is a bit uncertain as it is both the newest and most inconspicuous of the main opposition parties in the Duma. An opportunity may arise for the party if United Russia continues being heavily unpopular within the voting public and if a post-Putin political landscape would need a new big tent coalition party to take its place.

Sequel

In the next post, I will try to cover Russia’s smaller political parties which are either not represented in the Duma or have media traction and popularity. This will include parties such as Navalny’s Party of Progress along with others and the inclusion of a proper epilogue.

Some Sources: (If I listed all my sources, this list would run on and on)

by loewe418

2019 Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections (Part II)

Second part of this two-post series on the parliamentary elections in Ukraine focusing mainly on the results and the aftermath

Results

It’s been a few days since election day since July 21st and as expected from multiple opinion polls over the past month, Vladimir Zelensky and his party “Servant of the People” have won a landslide victory within the Verkhovna Rada. Four exit polls were released as polls closed within the country with the “Servant of the People” garnering more than 40% of the total vote within the country.

Yuriy Boyko’s “Opposition Platform – For Life” expectedly came into second place, followed by Tymoshenko’s “Fatherland”, Poroshenko’s “European Solidarity”, and Vakarchuk’s “Voice” respectively.

Official Results: (with approximately 98.95% of all votes counted)

  • Servant of the People: 43.1%
  • Opposition Platform – For Life: 13%
  • Fatherland: 8.2%
  • European Solidarity: 8.1%
  • Voice: 5.8%

Special Mentions to these smaller parties who didn’t breach the 5% threshold

  • Radical Party of Oleg Lyashko: 4%
  • Strength and Honour: 3.8%
  • Opposition Bloc: 3%
  • Ukrainian Strategy of Groysman: 2.4%
  • Party of Shariya: 2.1%

Turnout

The complete turnout for the election was approximately 49.8% , which is lower than the previous parliamentary elections in 2014 (which had a turnout of 51.9%).

However, the turnout by oblast and electoral district within the country was varied. The highest regions for voter turnout seemed to be oblasts in the West and the Centre of the country, with Lviv, Ternopil and Chernihiv oblasts leading the way with over 50% of voters showing up to cast their ballot.

Chernihiv overperformed while Zakarpattia underperformed in terms of voter turnout in comparison to the national average (Hromadske)

The opposite story is present in other oblasts of Ukraine, notably in Zakarpattia, Chernivtsi and Kherson oblasts where turnout seemed to be the lowest at below 40% in some cases.

Coalitions and Partnerships?

As soon as several exit polls were released, multiple leaders of the five parties expected to enter parliament have made rumblings on who they would cooperate with in the upcoming session of the Rada.

Zelensky had stated that the “Servant of the People” was ready to create a coalition with Svyatoslav Vakarchuk and his “Voice” party, with a priority on ending the war in the east along with the fight against corruption.

(Zelensky had previously stated that there would no possibilities of a coalition between him and any former members of the Party of Regions, which effectively rules out comprehensive cooperation with the Opposition Platform – For Life, which contains multiple members from the Party of Regions such as Boyko.)

Of course, a coalition would only be necessary if Zelensky and his party failed to garner enough for an outright majority in the Rada. Fortunately for Zelensky and his party, this did not seem to be the case, as they achieved an outright majority, with no need for talks involving the creation of a governing coalition from other parties as a result.

Any changes?

One of the most notable changes for the parliamentary elections in both 2014 and 2019 has been the substantial decrease of the pro-Russian electorate in Ukrainian politics. However, the pro-Russian electorate in Ukraine’s south and east have increased their participation in elections to a level on par with the country’s more politically active west.

Compared to 2014, the pro-Russian electorate has decreased. But then the east and partially south practically ignored the elections. Now they are actively participating in elections on a par with other regions.

Iryna Bekeshkina (Foundation for Democratic Initiatives) (Hromadske)
In comparison to 2014’s election (as shown above), the Russian speaking regions of Ukraine have had a jump in turnout, putting it on par with the rest of the country in some cases.

The old paradigm of one solid party solidifying the pro-Russian east and a more Ukrainian west in terms of voting blocs (which has existed ever since the late 1990’s barring the 2014 parliamentary election) did not completely exist at this election as well. Vladimir Zelensky had managed to create a voting bloc that stretched to every corner of the country. He along with the “Servant of the People” had managed to achieve first place in almost every oblast, with the exception of Donetsk and Lugansk (won by the Opposition Platform – For Life) and Lviv (won by Voice).

(Poroshenko however did win the popular vote from Ukrainians living outside of Ukraine, so that’s a win for him at least)

In essence, the model of “two Ukraines”, a patriotic west and a pro-Russian east have failed to materialize this year, with divisions on both sides of the spectrum. The pro-Russian parties have split into the Opposition Bloc and the Opposition Platform – For Life, while patriotic and more nationalist leaning parties have split into Voice, Fatherland and European Solidarity. As a result, Ukraine’s political landscape is much different than what it was pre-Maidan.

A few other notable changes include that parties associated with the post-Maidan reformers and pro-Europeanists associated with figures such as former PM Yatsenyuk and others suffered heavy losses or were disbanded before the events of April. Viktor Medvedchuk has made another comeback in Ukrainian politics with his party achieving second place, and Tymoshenko’s fortunes seemed to have not changed at all still relegated to the sidelines.

Epilogue:

Ukraine has had both a historic presidential and parliamentary election with an outright majority being achieved for the first time in the country’s recent history, giving him a wide range of power not seen before in Ukrainian politics. However, it remains to be seen how effective and how true to life Zelensky will be to President Holoborodko (his presidential persona in Servant of the People), whereupon there will be distinct effort in pursuing reforms within the country. Reforms which would put him into conflict with Ukraine’s establishment in both business and politics.

No other president in the history of Ukraine has had such resources under his control while facing such a weak and fragmented opposition and enjoying such enormous popularity among his compatriots.

Konstantin Shorkin (Carnegie Moscow Centre)

It is however a bit grating to see media outlets in Western Europe and the United States be a bit too rosy when it comes to him and his election victory and the “shockwaves” it would send to the oligarchs in the country (considering his campaign has heavy connections to Ihor Kolomoisky, another oligarch). His campaign still has conflicting and non-existing statements regarding key issues for the country and committing to a certain cause in these could very well reduce his popular image.

So far, he’s given little indication of what he might do with them, and there’s no unity even among his closest advisers on how soft or how tough a stance Ukraine must take with Russia and its own Russian-speaking population. The world has only really seen Zelenskiy the politician in campaign mode. He’s been impressive – but he’s still a wild card as Zelenskiy the leader.

Leonid Bershidsky (Moscow Times)

After all, Poroshenko was lauded with optimistic lenses back in 2014 as an oligarch who supported Maidan, only to be soured over time due to unpopular decisions and continued corruption. Time will tell if Zelensky’s popularity will continue for years on end, or will he be another Poroshenko and end up tangled in the web of Ukraine’s oligarchic politics.

Sources:

by loewe418

2019 Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections (Part I)

From an Outsider’s Perspective

Hey everyone! So for my actual first post, I wanted to cover the July 21 parliamentary elections in Ukraine!

Now for those who aren’t familiar with the situation, I’ll get started on a bit of background information that should help with those who don’t know too much about the country and its political culture.

Background:

Ukraine is a semi presidential system with a unicameral parliament with the country both having a President and a Prime Minister coexisting. There are several other countries which have this system, such as in France, in which there is both a presidential and a parliamentary section.

The parliament (known as the Verkhovna Rada) officially has around 450 seats, but due to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing conflict in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine, the number has been effectively reduced to around 423 deputies. During elections to the Verkhovna Rada, the country uses a 50/50 system with 50% of the seats allocated through a party list system (with a parliamentary election threshold of 5%) and the other half through a single member constituency voting system (essentially an FPTP system).

I found this graphic from Hromadske which should somewhat help with explaining how the Rada works.

Ukraine’s parliamentary elections this year have coincided with the country’s presidential election, where results I will discuss just a bit later in this piece. Of course, to those who are more familiar with how semi-presidential systems work, the parliament and the executive branch under the president have to agree with each other for policies to be successfully put forward. It is highly beneficial for Ukrainian presidents to have more than cooperative parliaments behind them, which is an explanation as to why this parliamentary election was called earlier than expected, with the normal date of the election sometime this fall.

More Specific Background:

On April 21, Ukraine elected a new president, Vladimir Zelensky, a maverick and a relative newcomer to Ukraine’s political scene, which for years had mostly consisted of connections and rivalries between different oligarchic interests between Ukraine’s more powerful groups. His popularity ranges from the fact that he isn’t an establishment candidate that have been quite common in Ukraine’s political scene for the past decade. His portrayal as a common school teacher turned president in his TV show “Servant of the People” (coincidentally the name of his political party), along with his populist and anti corruption stances have made him extremely popular among the public. He has also garnered attention as he has somewhat broken the east-west paradigm in Ukrainian politics due to him being a Russian speaker and from the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast in Southern Ukraine garnering votes from all over the country.

However, commentators have stated that his connections to the oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky, who owns the television station which runs “Servant of the People” have raised eyebrows about how radically different the new presidency could be over his predecessor Poroshenko.

His massive victory over Petro Poroshenko (with Zelensky winning 73% of the vote on the second round) has given him an opportunity, which he has taken, to encapsulate that popularity towards a parliamentary majority, therefore making life for the maverick president to be smoother and less plagued with the issues commonly associated with Ukraine’s fractious political scene.

The Players:

Vladimir Zelensky and The Servant of the People:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky gestures as he speaks during a press conference on the outcome of the Ukraine-EU summit in Kiev on July 8, 2019.

Probably the favourite front runner and the current golden boy of Ukrainian politics as of this moment, Zelensky’s landslide victory and widespread popularity in the April presidential election has carried over onto his newfound party for parliament, as polls have had his party ranging from a low of 38% of the vote to a high of almost 50%. However, the problems that plague Zelensky have also plagued the new party with it being relatively unknown and mystified to a certain degree, along with the usual critique of the party being another tool of influence for Kolomoisky.

An article from the Brookings Institute have said that observers have stated that the candidates within his party list consisted of

 “one-third reformers, one-third individuals with personal or business ties to Zelenskiy, and one-third Kolomoisky allies.”

Molly Montgomery (Brookings Institute)

The party’s policies have been described as populist (with Zelensky’s representative in the Rada, Ruslan Stefanchuk, describing themselves as libertarians interestingly enough). They have promised to be more dovish and less hostile to negotiations involving the pro-Russian separatist republics in the East (and acceptance of the Minsk agreements), but have still promised to move closer towards the EU and restructuring the armed forces to better fit NATO’s style. Anti-corruption programs and policies are still one of the main hallmarks of the party in its manifesto as well.

Petro Poroshenko and European Solidarity:

The last governing party, formerly known as the Petro Poroshenko Bloc (because rebranding names are cool) sits on the sidelines as the most likely third place party with around 7-9% in nationwide polling.

As the party associated with the former President, it has inherited his policies and his severe unpopularity among the Ukrainian public with some polls indicating disapproval rating of at least 50% and more.

Poroshenko’s (third last on the column) unpopularity almost reaches 70-80% with some polls, eclipsing that of even Medvedchuk.

While they are relegated from governance to third place, it not wise to completely ignore them, as they do represent a more aggressive and hawkish tendency within Ukrainian politics, especially their position on the sole use of the Ukrainian language in public, the rhetoric and actions on the pro-Russian separatist republics. Poroshenko’s presidential slogan of “Army, Faith and Language” will most likely still be the spirit of his party in the next session of the Rada. The antipathy shown by Poroshenko towards Zelensky will carry over in parliament and will contribute a headache of sorts for the new president.

One of the interesting points in their program is to successfully join the EU and NATO by 2023 (which is highly unrealistic but that’s my opinion).

Yulia Tymoshenko and Fatherland

The party of the golden gas girl herself, Fatherland has been in the mainstay of Ukrainian politics ever since the Orange Revolution back in 2004 when it coalesced multiple pro-European reformers and western minded nationalists into one single party when Yulia Tymoshenko was Prime Minister. Currently the party is expected to be in the fourth place (approximately 6-8%) in the upcoming elections, a far cry from their performances a decade ago.

Now, for the most part, Fatherland and Yulia Tymoshenko have been relegated into the sidelines for now as most of the more reformist and pro-European politicians having switched over to Poroshenko’s party. The party (along with Tymoshenko) have been described as quite populist as well, promising quite literally anything and everything to stay elected. However, the mantle of populism has moved over to Zelensky and the Servant of the People creating competition for populist rhetoric within Ukraine’s current political environment.

Within their platform, there seems to be nothing really too outstanding, with similar mentions of European integration as European Solidarity and a few quirky policy proposals such as the demonopolization of the gas sector in Ukraine and a reduction of the number of deputies in the Rada.

Svyatoslav Vakarchuk and Voice

Now sadly, for me, I don’t have a ton of information regarding this new party. Many have put it as the last party to breach the needed 5% electoral threshold for parliamentary representation, with the party going from 5-8% in nationwide polling. The party is also more regionally based with polls dictating it being more popular within Western Ukraine than anywhere else.

Vakarchuk is actually a musician and the lead vocalist of the Ukrainian band “Okean Elzy”. He once stated that he didn’t have any political ambitions but that tune changed around last year as he was touted to be a possible candidate for the upcoming presidential elections with earlier polls showing him possibly beating Poroshenko.

The party’s positions are quite similar to European Solidarity, calling for political and economic sanctions against the Russian Federation and a starkly pro-European stance when it comes to EU and NATO integration. The two unique things that has popped up during my research of them is that they wish to remove the FPTP single mandate constituency system and make Ukraine’s electoral system to be completely transformed to a “party-list” system, along with the pursuit of a national census.

Yuriy Boyko and the Opposition Platform – For Life

Now this party is one of the more interesting political groups in the Rada as of today since they are the only “pro-Russian” party within Ukraine’s current political environment (There’s another party called the Opposition Bloc but they’re not passing the 5% electoral threshold so they’re a subject for another time). The party is actually led by three men, Yuriy Boyko, Vadim Rabinovich and Viktor Medvedchuk. It is expected to be the second largest party in the Rada with approximately 10-15% of the vote. The party is also regionally stronger in the more Russian speaking areas of the country in the south and east and is seen as the spiritual successor of the former “Party of Regions” which dominated the east and south of Ukraine before the events of Maidan in 2014. The party list is dominated by many “old faces”, politicians who have been visible in Ukrainian politics for quite some time.

The party’s inclusion of Medvedchuk (who has strong connections to Vladimir Putin himself), have made it the only force in Ukrainian politics to be not Pro-European and instead be an advocate of normalization of ties between Russia and Ukraine. This has made it quite popular with segments of the population who are more keen on restoring ties than continuing on an antagonistic relationship. Boyko was also a candidate in the May presidential election getting fourth place in the first round (dominating in the Donbass region) indicating a level of strong support among the electorate in the east.

Medvedchuk has been quite vocal in his criticism of further EU integration even before Maidan in 2014 (If anything he’s consistent) and has been echoing statements made by the Kremlin in several instances. Politicians connected with the Opposition Platform have been observed to be in control of several news and television channels such as 112, NewsOne and ZIK.

The party’s platform is in favour of ending the blockade on the separatist republics along with the creation of direct negotiations between Kiev and said republics, along with the promise of lower gas prices with agreements done with the Russian Federation.

Simply put, they’re the antithesis and the polar opposite to European Solidarity and Poroshenko in many ways.

Possible Results?

As election day approaches on July 21st, (which by the time this post finishes, should be on the next day after this is posted), there seems to be talk of whether Zelensky will get the majority that he needs in the Rada or the necessity of the creation of a coalition. Whatever happens, we have to wait and see on election day itself.

I will try my best to write a follow up Part II post in the next week involving the results once they come out in full.

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by loewe418

Introductory Blog Post

Hello there everyone! I decided to start this blog as a way for me to just share information and my thoughts and opinions on various global and domestic events which I follow that I find interesting! This can range from geopolitics to even memes about popular events in the current day. I hope you enjoy reading the topics that I decide to share and to stay tuned!