Tag / Ukraine

by loewe418

2019 Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections (Part II)

Second part of this two-post series on the parliamentary elections in Ukraine focusing mainly on the results and the aftermath

Results

It’s been a few days since election day since July 21st and as expected from multiple opinion polls over the past month, Vladimir Zelensky and his party “Servant of the People” have won a landslide victory within the Verkhovna Rada. Four exit polls were released as polls closed within the country with the “Servant of the People” garnering more than 40% of the total vote within the country.

Yuriy Boyko’s “Opposition Platform – For Life” expectedly came into second place, followed by Tymoshenko’s “Fatherland”, Poroshenko’s “European Solidarity”, and Vakarchuk’s “Voice” respectively.

Official Results: (with approximately 98.95% of all votes counted)

  • Servant of the People: 43.1%
  • Opposition Platform – For Life: 13%
  • Fatherland: 8.2%
  • European Solidarity: 8.1%
  • Voice: 5.8%

Special Mentions to these smaller parties who didn’t breach the 5% threshold

  • Radical Party of Oleg Lyashko: 4%
  • Strength and Honour: 3.8%
  • Opposition Bloc: 3%
  • Ukrainian Strategy of Groysman: 2.4%
  • Party of Shariya: 2.1%

Turnout

The complete turnout for the election was approximately 49.8% , which is lower than the previous parliamentary elections in 2014 (which had a turnout of 51.9%).

However, the turnout by oblast and electoral district within the country was varied. The highest regions for voter turnout seemed to be oblasts in the West and the Centre of the country, with Lviv, Ternopil and Chernihiv oblasts leading the way with over 50% of voters showing up to cast their ballot.

Chernihiv overperformed while Zakarpattia underperformed in terms of voter turnout in comparison to the national average (Hromadske)

The opposite story is present in other oblasts of Ukraine, notably in Zakarpattia, Chernivtsi and Kherson oblasts where turnout seemed to be the lowest at below 40% in some cases.

Coalitions and Partnerships?

As soon as several exit polls were released, multiple leaders of the five parties expected to enter parliament have made rumblings on who they would cooperate with in the upcoming session of the Rada.

Zelensky had stated that the “Servant of the People” was ready to create a coalition with Svyatoslav Vakarchuk and his “Voice” party, with a priority on ending the war in the east along with the fight against corruption.

(Zelensky had previously stated that there would no possibilities of a coalition between him and any former members of the Party of Regions, which effectively rules out comprehensive cooperation with the Opposition Platform – For Life, which contains multiple members from the Party of Regions such as Boyko.)

Of course, a coalition would only be necessary if Zelensky and his party failed to garner enough for an outright majority in the Rada. Fortunately for Zelensky and his party, this did not seem to be the case, as they achieved an outright majority, with no need for talks involving the creation of a governing coalition from other parties as a result.

Any changes?

One of the most notable changes for the parliamentary elections in both 2014 and 2019 has been the substantial decrease of the pro-Russian electorate in Ukrainian politics. However, the pro-Russian electorate in Ukraine’s south and east have increased their participation in elections to a level on par with the country’s more politically active west.

Compared to 2014, the pro-Russian electorate has decreased. But then the east and partially south practically ignored the elections. Now they are actively participating in elections on a par with other regions.

Iryna Bekeshkina (Foundation for Democratic Initiatives) (Hromadske)
In comparison to 2014’s election (as shown above), the Russian speaking regions of Ukraine have had a jump in turnout, putting it on par with the rest of the country in some cases.

The old paradigm of one solid party solidifying the pro-Russian east and a more Ukrainian west in terms of voting blocs (which has existed ever since the late 1990’s barring the 2014 parliamentary election) did not completely exist at this election as well. Vladimir Zelensky had managed to create a voting bloc that stretched to every corner of the country. He along with the “Servant of the People” had managed to achieve first place in almost every oblast, with the exception of Donetsk and Lugansk (won by the Opposition Platform – For Life) and Lviv (won by Voice).

(Poroshenko however did win the popular vote from Ukrainians living outside of Ukraine, so that’s a win for him at least)

In essence, the model of “two Ukraines”, a patriotic west and a pro-Russian east have failed to materialize this year, with divisions on both sides of the spectrum. The pro-Russian parties have split into the Opposition Bloc and the Opposition Platform – For Life, while patriotic and more nationalist leaning parties have split into Voice, Fatherland and European Solidarity. As a result, Ukraine’s political landscape is much different than what it was pre-Maidan.

A few other notable changes include that parties associated with the post-Maidan reformers and pro-Europeanists associated with figures such as former PM Yatsenyuk and others suffered heavy losses or were disbanded before the events of April. Viktor Medvedchuk has made another comeback in Ukrainian politics with his party achieving second place, and Tymoshenko’s fortunes seemed to have not changed at all still relegated to the sidelines.

Epilogue:

Ukraine has had both a historic presidential and parliamentary election with an outright majority being achieved for the first time in the country’s recent history, giving him a wide range of power not seen before in Ukrainian politics. However, it remains to be seen how effective and how true to life Zelensky will be to President Holoborodko (his presidential persona in Servant of the People), whereupon there will be distinct effort in pursuing reforms within the country. Reforms which would put him into conflict with Ukraine’s establishment in both business and politics.

No other president in the history of Ukraine has had such resources under his control while facing such a weak and fragmented opposition and enjoying such enormous popularity among his compatriots.

Konstantin Shorkin (Carnegie Moscow Centre)

It is however a bit grating to see media outlets in Western Europe and the United States be a bit too rosy when it comes to him and his election victory and the “shockwaves” it would send to the oligarchs in the country (considering his campaign has heavy connections to Ihor Kolomoisky, another oligarch). His campaign still has conflicting and non-existing statements regarding key issues for the country and committing to a certain cause in these could very well reduce his popular image.

So far, he’s given little indication of what he might do with them, and there’s no unity even among his closest advisers on how soft or how tough a stance Ukraine must take with Russia and its own Russian-speaking population. The world has only really seen Zelenskiy the politician in campaign mode. He’s been impressive – but he’s still a wild card as Zelenskiy the leader.

Leonid Bershidsky (Moscow Times)

After all, Poroshenko was lauded with optimistic lenses back in 2014 as an oligarch who supported Maidan, only to be soured over time due to unpopular decisions and continued corruption. Time will tell if Zelensky’s popularity will continue for years on end, or will he be another Poroshenko and end up tangled in the web of Ukraine’s oligarchic politics.

Sources:

by loewe418

2019 Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections (Part I)

From an Outsider’s Perspective

Hey everyone! So for my actual first post, I wanted to cover the July 21 parliamentary elections in Ukraine!

Now for those who aren’t familiar with the situation, I’ll get started on a bit of background information that should help with those who don’t know too much about the country and its political culture.

Background:

Ukraine is a semi presidential system with a unicameral parliament with the country both having a President and a Prime Minister coexisting. There are several other countries which have this system, such as in France, in which there is both a presidential and a parliamentary section.

The parliament (known as the Verkhovna Rada) officially has around 450 seats, but due to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing conflict in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine, the number has been effectively reduced to around 423 deputies. During elections to the Verkhovna Rada, the country uses a 50/50 system with 50% of the seats allocated through a party list system (with a parliamentary election threshold of 5%) and the other half through a single member constituency voting system (essentially an FPTP system).

I found this graphic from Hromadske which should somewhat help with explaining how the Rada works.

Ukraine’s parliamentary elections this year have coincided with the country’s presidential election, where results I will discuss just a bit later in this piece. Of course, to those who are more familiar with how semi-presidential systems work, the parliament and the executive branch under the president have to agree with each other for policies to be successfully put forward. It is highly beneficial for Ukrainian presidents to have more than cooperative parliaments behind them, which is an explanation as to why this parliamentary election was called earlier than expected, with the normal date of the election sometime this fall.

More Specific Background:

On April 21, Ukraine elected a new president, Vladimir Zelensky, a maverick and a relative newcomer to Ukraine’s political scene, which for years had mostly consisted of connections and rivalries between different oligarchic interests between Ukraine’s more powerful groups. His popularity ranges from the fact that he isn’t an establishment candidate that have been quite common in Ukraine’s political scene for the past decade. His portrayal as a common school teacher turned president in his TV show “Servant of the People” (coincidentally the name of his political party), along with his populist and anti corruption stances have made him extremely popular among the public. He has also garnered attention as he has somewhat broken the east-west paradigm in Ukrainian politics due to him being a Russian speaker and from the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast in Southern Ukraine garnering votes from all over the country.

However, commentators have stated that his connections to the oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky, who owns the television station which runs “Servant of the People” have raised eyebrows about how radically different the new presidency could be over his predecessor Poroshenko.

His massive victory over Petro Poroshenko (with Zelensky winning 73% of the vote on the second round) has given him an opportunity, which he has taken, to encapsulate that popularity towards a parliamentary majority, therefore making life for the maverick president to be smoother and less plagued with the issues commonly associated with Ukraine’s fractious political scene.

The Players:

Vladimir Zelensky and The Servant of the People:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky gestures as he speaks during a press conference on the outcome of the Ukraine-EU summit in Kiev on July 8, 2019.

Probably the favourite front runner and the current golden boy of Ukrainian politics as of this moment, Zelensky’s landslide victory and widespread popularity in the April presidential election has carried over onto his newfound party for parliament, as polls have had his party ranging from a low of 38% of the vote to a high of almost 50%. However, the problems that plague Zelensky have also plagued the new party with it being relatively unknown and mystified to a certain degree, along with the usual critique of the party being another tool of influence for Kolomoisky.

An article from the Brookings Institute have said that observers have stated that the candidates within his party list consisted of

 “one-third reformers, one-third individuals with personal or business ties to Zelenskiy, and one-third Kolomoisky allies.”

Molly Montgomery (Brookings Institute)

The party’s policies have been described as populist (with Zelensky’s representative in the Rada, Ruslan Stefanchuk, describing themselves as libertarians interestingly enough). They have promised to be more dovish and less hostile to negotiations involving the pro-Russian separatist republics in the East (and acceptance of the Minsk agreements), but have still promised to move closer towards the EU and restructuring the armed forces to better fit NATO’s style. Anti-corruption programs and policies are still one of the main hallmarks of the party in its manifesto as well.

Petro Poroshenko and European Solidarity:

The last governing party, formerly known as the Petro Poroshenko Bloc (because rebranding names are cool) sits on the sidelines as the most likely third place party with around 7-9% in nationwide polling.

As the party associated with the former President, it has inherited his policies and his severe unpopularity among the Ukrainian public with some polls indicating disapproval rating of at least 50% and more.

Poroshenko’s (third last on the column) unpopularity almost reaches 70-80% with some polls, eclipsing that of even Medvedchuk.

While they are relegated from governance to third place, it not wise to completely ignore them, as they do represent a more aggressive and hawkish tendency within Ukrainian politics, especially their position on the sole use of the Ukrainian language in public, the rhetoric and actions on the pro-Russian separatist republics. Poroshenko’s presidential slogan of “Army, Faith and Language” will most likely still be the spirit of his party in the next session of the Rada. The antipathy shown by Poroshenko towards Zelensky will carry over in parliament and will contribute a headache of sorts for the new president.

One of the interesting points in their program is to successfully join the EU and NATO by 2023 (which is highly unrealistic but that’s my opinion).

Yulia Tymoshenko and Fatherland

The party of the golden gas girl herself, Fatherland has been in the mainstay of Ukrainian politics ever since the Orange Revolution back in 2004 when it coalesced multiple pro-European reformers and western minded nationalists into one single party when Yulia Tymoshenko was Prime Minister. Currently the party is expected to be in the fourth place (approximately 6-8%) in the upcoming elections, a far cry from their performances a decade ago.

Now, for the most part, Fatherland and Yulia Tymoshenko have been relegated into the sidelines for now as most of the more reformist and pro-European politicians having switched over to Poroshenko’s party. The party (along with Tymoshenko) have been described as quite populist as well, promising quite literally anything and everything to stay elected. However, the mantle of populism has moved over to Zelensky and the Servant of the People creating competition for populist rhetoric within Ukraine’s current political environment.

Within their platform, there seems to be nothing really too outstanding, with similar mentions of European integration as European Solidarity and a few quirky policy proposals such as the demonopolization of the gas sector in Ukraine and a reduction of the number of deputies in the Rada.

Svyatoslav Vakarchuk and Voice

Now sadly, for me, I don’t have a ton of information regarding this new party. Many have put it as the last party to breach the needed 5% electoral threshold for parliamentary representation, with the party going from 5-8% in nationwide polling. The party is also more regionally based with polls dictating it being more popular within Western Ukraine than anywhere else.

Vakarchuk is actually a musician and the lead vocalist of the Ukrainian band “Okean Elzy”. He once stated that he didn’t have any political ambitions but that tune changed around last year as he was touted to be a possible candidate for the upcoming presidential elections with earlier polls showing him possibly beating Poroshenko.

The party’s positions are quite similar to European Solidarity, calling for political and economic sanctions against the Russian Federation and a starkly pro-European stance when it comes to EU and NATO integration. The two unique things that has popped up during my research of them is that they wish to remove the FPTP single mandate constituency system and make Ukraine’s electoral system to be completely transformed to a “party-list” system, along with the pursuit of a national census.

Yuriy Boyko and the Opposition Platform – For Life

Now this party is one of the more interesting political groups in the Rada as of today since they are the only “pro-Russian” party within Ukraine’s current political environment (There’s another party called the Opposition Bloc but they’re not passing the 5% electoral threshold so they’re a subject for another time). The party is actually led by three men, Yuriy Boyko, Vadim Rabinovich and Viktor Medvedchuk. It is expected to be the second largest party in the Rada with approximately 10-15% of the vote. The party is also regionally stronger in the more Russian speaking areas of the country in the south and east and is seen as the spiritual successor of the former “Party of Regions” which dominated the east and south of Ukraine before the events of Maidan in 2014. The party list is dominated by many “old faces”, politicians who have been visible in Ukrainian politics for quite some time.

The party’s inclusion of Medvedchuk (who has strong connections to Vladimir Putin himself), have made it the only force in Ukrainian politics to be not Pro-European and instead be an advocate of normalization of ties between Russia and Ukraine. This has made it quite popular with segments of the population who are more keen on restoring ties than continuing on an antagonistic relationship. Boyko was also a candidate in the May presidential election getting fourth place in the first round (dominating in the Donbass region) indicating a level of strong support among the electorate in the east.

Medvedchuk has been quite vocal in his criticism of further EU integration even before Maidan in 2014 (If anything he’s consistent) and has been echoing statements made by the Kremlin in several instances. Politicians connected with the Opposition Platform have been observed to be in control of several news and television channels such as 112, NewsOne and ZIK.

The party’s platform is in favour of ending the blockade on the separatist republics along with the creation of direct negotiations between Kiev and said republics, along with the promise of lower gas prices with agreements done with the Russian Federation.

Simply put, they’re the antithesis and the polar opposite to European Solidarity and Poroshenko in many ways.

Possible Results?

As election day approaches on July 21st, (which by the time this post finishes, should be on the next day after this is posted), there seems to be talk of whether Zelensky will get the majority that he needs in the Rada or the necessity of the creation of a coalition. Whatever happens, we have to wait and see on election day itself.

I will try my best to write a follow up Part II post in the next week involving the results once they come out in full.

Sources Used: